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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Employer/Surety ("Employer") does not viably dispute the accuracy of the Statement of 
Facts contained in Jordan's Opening Brief. Moreover, Employer failed to negate such 
unrebutted and cited facts. Likewise, Employer completely failed to repudiate the controlling 
judicial and statutory law cited and relied upon by Jordan throughout his Opening Brief. 
Unfortunately, Employer purports to present appellate arguments/assertions premised 
largely on, supposition, revisionist history, arbitrary action and selective omissions. Similarly, 
the Response reveals that rather than reference or even acknowledge controlling legal authority, 
Employer merely opts to equivocate or outright ignore such prevailing judicial strictures as set 
forth by the Supreme Court of Idaho. This strategy exposes the underlying, fundamental factual 
as well as insunnountable legal deficiencies integral to Employer's positions, while 
simultaneously demonstrating a synchronicity with the problematic administrative practices 
employed by Referee Marsters and ultimately the Industrial Commission through its April 13, 
2015, Findings, Conclusions and Order. 
By way of example, in its "Statement of the Case," Employer asserts: 
Claimant's treating physician released him from care in March 2010, noting that 
Claimant was asymptomatic, tolerating full and nonnal activities, including work 
and that Claimant did not request additional evaluation. 
Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief~ pg. 2 ( emphasis added). As indicated by the fact that 
Employer failed to provide any supporting citation, there is no evidence in record documenting 
that Dr. Heiner, the "treating physician," directly provided any such "release," nor made the 
purported "notations" in March of 2010. Quite to the contrary, the actual evidence reveals that 
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Dr. Heiner's one and only involvement in Jordan's treatment transpired on the isolated date of 
February 16, 2010, wherein he contemplated a "probable phone discharge" and erroneously 
advised "The patient was counseled that the pain does not indicate any significant pathology and 
should resolve gradually over time ... " Hr'g Ex. G, pg. 157. Simply stated, the medical records 
determinatively prove that this defense assertion is a fiction. 
Astoundingly, Employer implicitly acknowledged the contrived nature of its proposition, 
in later inconsistently avowing: 
A few weeks later on March 22, 2010 a physician's assistant from the clinic 
telephoned Claimant to see how he was doing. After speaking to him, the PA 
reported that he was doing his norn1al activity, including normal work, that he 
was asymptomatic and did not require furiher treatment. 
See, Respondents' I 0/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 9 (underline original) (emphasis added). This is 
merely a recitation of Employer's inaccurate averrnents made to the Industrial Commission1• 
Jordan directly addressed the factual and legal fallacies of these assertions, setting forth: 
An objective review of this "check-the-box" fonn does not reveal any fom1 of 
direct contact, telephonically or otherwise, between a "physician's assistant" and 
Claimant on that date and most significantly, does not even include any actual 
medical opinions. Specifically, this forn1 contains two distinct signatures and the 
one under the "check-the-box" entries is wholly devoid of any professional 
medical designation. Moreover, the second bottom signature designated as a 
"PA-C/NP" does not document any kind of direct interaction with Claimant, but 
rather merely ascribes having "reviewed the medical file and concur with the 
medical discharge." See, Exhibit G, pg. 160 ( emphasis added). More than likely, 
this "check-the-box" fonn was nothing more than a routine administrative closure 
of Claimant's case per the "phone discharge" instructions specifically set forth by 
Dr. Heiner on February 16, 2010, and conspicuously does not account for the fact 
that Dr. Heiner specifically infonned Claimant that his herniated disc pathology 
1 "A few weeks later on March 22, 20 IO a physician's assistant from the clinic telephoned Claimant to see how 
he was doing. After speaking with him, the PA reported ... " See, Defs' 1/13/15 Post-Hr'g Response Brief, pg. 8 
(emphasis added). 
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was insignificant, or that Dr. Heiner injected the site with lidocainc. See, Exhibit 
G, pg. 157. In any event, such postulation is undoubtedly the reason that the 
Commission ascribes "minimal weight" to "check-the-box" fonns, especially 
when "without explanation of how the physician reached the conclusion ... the 
fact finder has no way of knowing what facts the doctor relied upon in fonning 
his or her opinions, and the medical relevance of those facts." Willford v. 11ie 
Rooter Guys, 2010 IIC 0044.1, 0044.11 (2010). 
Clmt's 2/3/15 Post-Hr'g Reply Brief: pgs. 5-6. Remarkably, the Commission's holdings in 
Wil(ford are a direct reflection of the Comi's prior rnling that even with explanatory medical 
testimony: 
[T]hey were most likely filled out by a billing clerk, and thus had no bearing on 
his medical diagnosis, but were rather related to billing purposes. Therefore, the 
checked boxes on these forms are not evidence that a reasonable mind would 
use to support a conclusion ... Because of the ambi6:ruity inherent ... this fon11 
cannot be considered evidence that [the treating physicians] believed [the injured 
worker's] injury was not work related. 
Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch C01p., 145 Idaho 325, 333-334, 179 P .3d 288 (2008). Distinct from 
Stevens-McAtee, Employer did not provide any explanatory evidence whatsoever to reveal the 
purpose or medical implications, if any, of the March 22, 2010, "check-the-box" form, nor even 
the identity or professional designation, of all the individual(s) that initialed the fon11. 
Significantly, Employer failed to avail itself of the opportunities provided through cross-
examination to adduce testimony directly from Jordan that any such telephone contact even 
transpired on March 22, 2010. As a matter of practicality, without such clarification and 
identification, subjective "interpretation" of this ambiguous office fon11 is an exercise in pure 
speculation. As such, per the Court's ruling in Stevens-McAtee, the March 22, 2010, "check-
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the-box" office fonn ts "not evidence a reasonable mind would use to support" a medical 
conclusion. 
Notably, as in numerous other instances, Employer failed to directly address the actual 
facts and controlling law related to the veracity of its reliance upon such "check-the-box" office 
fom1, instead resorting to wholly unsubstantiated avennents that Jordan's reliance upon the 
treating physician's actual medical records and his legible narrative contained therein, somehow 
constitutes an "entirely misleading" omission. Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 20 
n2. Evidently, the best that Employer can muster, is to criticize Jordan's reliance on the 
decipherable medical records/na1Tative actually generated by the doctor, per the Court's 
controlling edicts, rather than Employer's legally e1Toneous subjective interpretation of a 
completely ambiguous office "check-the-box" fonn. To that end, any "entirely misleading" 
accusations by Employer are ill-infom1ed and, are, at best, disingenuous. Additionally, this 
dubious defense strategy mimics the Commission's deliberative administrative methodology of 
refusing to abide by the Court's clear mandates with respect to the weight, or lack thereof, 
afforded to certain types of evidence. 
With respect to "misleading omissions," Employer asserts that Jordan "worked for 
approximately a year and a half without need for any medical treatment relating to his neck. 
(Tr. pg. 91 )" Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 9 ( emphasis added). Contrary to this 
Employer avowal, a review of page 91 of the Hearing Transcript establishes that no such 
testimony exists. Rather the facts in evidence reveal the actual exchange as: 
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Q. Now, from that point when your treatment is concluded in February of 2010 
up until the following summer of 2011, you didn't have any treatment for your 
neck; correct? 
A. That's correct. I did not. 
(Tr., p. 91, LL 20-24) ( emphasis added). The tenn "need" does not appear anywhere on page 
91. In any event, the "need" for, and actual receipt of medical treatment are obviously two 
distinct concepts. Again, such strained extrapolations seems to be the best that Employer can 
conjure to deflect the overwhelming and unrcbutted medical evidence/opinions from Drs. Foutz, 
Doerr and Verska, that as a direct result of the subject January 12, 2010, accepted work-related 
accident and injuries, Jordan did, in fact, "need" neck treatment, up to, and including a cervical 
fusion surgery. As with the Industrial Commission, Employer's reliance upon, or espousal of 
non-existent testimony is, at best, questionable and clearly contravenes controlling law. The 
Court was unequivocal in admonishing 'Just as fundamental, however, is the principle that 
factfinding in contested cases is governed exclusively by the record of the hearing.' Mazzone 
v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,761,302 P.3d 718 (2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
In keeping with "misleading omissions," given that it cannot rebut Dr. Foutz's 
testimony2, Employer, in an apparent attempt to somehow undennine Dr. Foutz and Dr. Doerr, 
2 With respect to conspicuous "omissions," throughout its "Statement of Facts," Respondents failed to disclose or 
even acknowledge Dr. Foutz's recorded testimony, which it adduced by taking the Doctor's pre-hearing deposition. 
Notably, in implicitly recognizing the absolutely devastating effect that Dr. Foutz's unrebutted testimony has upon 
Respondents' unsubstantiated positions, it does not appear that Respondents cited to the Doctor's deposition 
testimony even once throughout their entire Response Brief. 
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inexplicably repeats3 the asse1tion that "Claimant got in to see Dr. Timothy Doerr of Orthopedic 
Associates on August 18, 2011. Although he had been referred for his knee, when he saw Dr. 
DoeiT his primary complaint was his neck symptoms ... " Respondents' 10/ 10/15 Response 
Brief, pg. 10. As a matter of reality, Employer is fully aware of the inaccuracy of such a 
contention, in that it directly addressed this issue with Dr. Foutz, wherein the Doctor 
unequivocally testified: 
Q. Or is it possible you were referring him to that office for his knee? 
A. The primary referral, initially, was for his knee and for -- to review spine 
symptoms. The primary refeITal referral --
Q. But at that time for his low back, right? 
A. Well, there's actually a telephone note related to that which indicates both 
the cervical spine and low back after review of the imaging. 
(Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., p. 38, LI. 23-25) ( emphasis added). The affected nature of this contention 
is further negated by Dr. DoeJT's August 18, 2011, responsive referral correspcmdence to Dr. 
Foutz, therein setting forth in pertinent pa1t, "Thank you for the kind referral of Edward 
Jordan. I had the pleasure of seeing your patient ... on August 18, 2011 for axial neck pain 
and bilateral knee pain." Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 50 ( emphasis added). As previously briefed, this 
Employer tactic is a not so subtle variant of the Commission's "rationalization" to arbitrarily 
ignore Dr. Foutz's unrebutted testimonial clarification/explanation of his own medical records 
and Jordan's cervical symptom history, in favor of a subjective, prejudicial interpretation, 
'"It is clear from the records of Dr. Foutz that the referral for orthopedic consultation had nothing to do with 
Claimant's neck ... " See, Defs' 1/13/15 Post-Hr'g Response Brief, pg. 10 (emphasis added). 
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thereby directly violating clear mandates set fo1ih by the Comi. Stevens-McAtee, 145 Idaho at 
336. 
In what can only be described as a wholly revisionist "interpretation" of the evidentiary 
record, Employer dubiously proclaims4 "[W]hile Dr. Doerr was attempting to get the surety for 
the 2006 claim to auth01ize his proposed surgery, Claimant was attempting to convince the VA 
that his neck problems were service related." Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 12. 
As in too many other instances, the evidence of record establishes that Employer is well aware of 
the actual facts, in that they specifically addressed this precise issue during the July 18, 2013, 
hearing, to which Jordan provided unrebutted testimony: 
Q. All right. Well, whether you asked Dr. Foutz for this or not, did you make a 
claim for the VA your you're neck problems were service related? 
A. My neck problems went in with my claim, as did all the problems I was 
having, and while I was at the VA numerous time I told them it was a work-
related incident. 
(Tr., p. 99, LL 12-17) (emphasis added). The veracity of Jordan's testimony is corroborated 
through the actual VA records which unambiguously provide: 
Dr. Doerr has recommended an anterior cervical decompression and fusion of C4-
6 and veteran says he tentatively has set this up for June 6, 2012. He is still 
working on whether his insurance will cover it temporarily until his lawyers can 
get the Workman's Comp (or Occupational medicine) insurance to cover it since 
he feels this is a work related injury. 
Hr' g Ex. K, pg. 272 (emphasis added). Again, this fallacious assertion by Employer seems to 
mimic the Commission's policies of making factual proclamations which do not actually exist, or 
4 Respondents proffered the same unsubstantiated assertion to the Industrial Commission. See, Defs' 1/13/15 Post-
Hr'g Response Brief, pg. 12, see also, Clmt's 2/3/15 Post-Hr'g Reply Brief, pg. 4. 
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otherwise patently misstate the objective evidence in record. Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, 
Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 761 ("[A]n agency may not use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for 
evidence presented at hearing."). 
Unfortunately, throughout the remainder of its Response Brief, Employer, in large part, 
fails or otherwise refuses to directly address Jordan's legal-based appellate arguments. Rather, 
similar to the Industrial Commission's deliberative practice, Employer's briefing seemingly 
constitutes a dodge of the actual evidence in record and applicable controlling law. Regrettably, 
as with the underlying administrative proceedings, Employer appears to do little more than 
proffer an invitation to capriciously discount the unrebutted factual record, while 
contemporaneously 1gnonng the controlling judicial/legal constraints oveniding the 
Commission's deliberative process, in favor of arbitrary administrative action to the complete 
prejudice of an injured worker. 
11. ARGUMENT and AUTHORITY 
The Court will not consider appeal issues which are not supported by propositions of 
law, authority, or argument. Langley v. State, 126 Idaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). "A 
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both 
are lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P .2d 966 (1996) ( emphasis added). The 
provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed "in favor of the 
employees in order to serve the humane purposes for which it was promulgated." Wernecke v. 
St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009) (citations omitted). 
"Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured." Combs v. 
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Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695,698,769 P.2d 572 (1989) (citation omitted). "Workmen's 
compensation cases, because of their medical aspects, depend upon knowledge neither 
expected nor possessed by lay witnesses, and the basis for any award must rest upon and be 
supported by medical testimony." Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 163, 997 P.2d 621 
(2000) ( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firn1 conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948) (emphasis added). 
A. The Industrial Commission's Credibilitv and Medical Causation 
Findings/Conclusions are Not Supported by Substantial and Competent 
Evidence and Do Not Comport with Controlling Law. 
The overwhelming preponderance of objective, reliable, and corroborated evidence 
proves that Jordan's accepted January 12, 2010, work-related accident resulted in extensive 
cervical injuries necessitating the June 6, 2012, tri-level decompression and fusion surgery 
performed by Dr. Doe1T. With respect to Industrial Commission proceedings, it is a 
"fundamental . . . principle that fact finding in contested cases is governed exclusively by the 
record of the hearing." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,761,302 P.3d 718 
(2013) ( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). "[T]he referee is charged with taking an 
independent role as an adjudicator, must listen to the testimony of experts, and must render an 
impartial decision based upon the evidence in the record and the law ... " Mazzone v. Texas 
Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho at 761 ( emphasis added). "An agency that uses its specialized 
knowledge as a substitute for evidence will not have it order sustained." 154 Idaho at 761-62 
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( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). "[A]n order of the Commission must be set aside where 
the law is misapplied to the evidence." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 697, 769 P.2d 
572 (1989). As is systemic throughout, Employer failed to present "substantial and competent 
evidence" arguments premised upon the application of controlling law to the objective, 
unrebutted evidence in this case. 
Co1Tespondingly, Employer failed to directly address Jordan's factually and legally based 
arguments. Notably, Employer failed to dispute: 
• That as a matter of law, Jordan is "observationally" credible; 
• That Jordan's hearing testimony was consistent with that provided during his July 24, 
2012, deposition; 
• That as a means to discredit Jordan, Referee Marsters and ultimately the Industrial 
Commission attributed testimony to Jordan which does not exist in the evidentiary 
record; 
• That as a means to discredit Jordan and Dr. Foutz, Referee Marsters and ultimately 
the Industrial Commission relied upon an exhibit ("telephone message from July 26, 
2011 ") which does not exist in the evidentiary record; 
• That as a means to discredit and "undiagnosed" Dr. Foutz, Referee Marsters and 
ultimately the Industrial Commission substituted5 its own diagnosis/interpretation of 
Dr. Foutz's medical records, rather than act in accord with controlling law and accept 
Dr. Foutz's testimonial clarification/explanation thereof; 
• That Dr. Foutz provided unrebutted testimony, in his capacity as Jordan's Board 
Certified personal physician, corroborating Jordan's presentation of medical evidence 
and cervical symptom history; 
5 "When a finder of fact exceeds this role and engages in medical diagnosis, this Court loses confidence that the 
Commission's referee is not rejecting or discounting admissible and competent evidence offered by the claimant 
based merely on the referee's own unqualified medical opinions." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, btc., 154 ldaho at 
761. 
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• That as a means to discredit Jordan and Dr. Doerr, the Industrial Commission devised 
a chronology for disclosure of the undisputed January 12, 2010, accident and injuries, 
which is directly contradicted by the actual evidence in record; 
• That it was clearly enoneous and contrary to controlling legal authority for Referee 
Marsters and ultimately the Industrial Commission to utilize credibility findings as a 
means to summarily ignore or otherwise discount the unrebutted opinions of Dr. 
Doerr and Dr. Verska; and 
• That the Stevens-McAtee, and Vawter decisions constitute controlling and persuasive 
authority in this case; and 
Despite the foregoing, Employer proclaims, again without citation, that "This appeal does not 
raise any legal issues ... " and "No error is asse1ied with regard to the conduct of the Industrial 
Commission hearing process." Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pgs. 10 and 29. Even a 
succinct review of Jordan's appellate briefing to the Comi demonstrates the patent farcicality of 
this asse1iion. 
Astonishingly, in contravention of the objective hearing record, Employer erroneously 
proclaims "The Commission had before it and considered all of the documentary evidence and 
otherwise that had been submitted by Claimant." Id. at pg. 10. In addition to the foregoing, the 
actual hearing record establishes quite the opposite. Specifically, following the July 18, 2013, 
hearing, Referee Marsters left the record open for the submission of supplemental exhibits by 
both Parties. Subsequently, on September 17, 2013, Referee Marsters issued an "Order 
Confinning Admission of Items Into Evidence," therein settling Employer's Exhibit Nos. 1 3, 
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along with Jordan's supplemental Exhibits Y6 and Z7 into evidence. See, Appellant's October 
20, 2015, Motion and Statement to Augment Agency Record. 
For reasons unknown, the record reveals that when it came time for administrative 
deliberation, Referee Marsters and ultimately the Industrial Commission failed to identify, 
consider and incorporate all of Jordan's Exhibits. Demonstrably, under the "Evidence 
Considered" heading of their respective decisions, both Referee Marsters and the Industrial 
Commission completely failed to list Jordan's Exhibits Y and Z. R., pg. 4; Referee's 3/18/15 
Findings & Recommendations, pg. 4. Moreover, neither Referee Marsters nor the Industrial 
Commission cited to Jordan's Exhibits Y and Zin their respective decisions. Contrastingly, both 
Referee Marsters and the Industrial Commission listed Employer's Exhibit Nos. 1-3 as "admitted 
at and following the hearing" and actually extended the courtesy of considering and citing to 
Employer's Exhibits. R., pgs. 4 and 21; Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pgs. 4 
and 22. The Court has had occasion to reject similar arbitrary administrative exclusions, ruling: 
From the record before us we are constrained to view the claimant's evidence 
having been fully presented, the denial of the defendants of the right to be 
heard was a denial of due process. 
Duggan v. Potlach Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 264, 441 P .2d 172 (1968) ( emphasis added). 
Furthennore, such a discemable administrative exclusion, necessarily establishes that contrary to 
judicial dictates, Referee Marsters and the Commission deprived Jordan of an "impartial decision 
based upon the evidence in record and the law ... " Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 
6 Jordan's service-related medical records. 
7 Jordan's service-related persom1el records. 
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Idaho at 761. As such, the Industrial Commission's April 13, 2015, Decision and Order are not 
premised upon substantial and competent evidence and do not comport with controlling law. 
As an apparent alternative attempt to somehow construct support for the Commission's 
extensively flawed decision, Employer deelares, despite the objective evidence in record, "the 
Court need look no further than the repo1is and testimony of Dr. Robert Friedman." 
Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 20. Such a pica epitomizes the insunnountable 
factual and legal deficiencies integral to both the Employer's contentions and the Commission's 
administrative deliberative process. 
Initially, with respect to controlling legal dictates, the Comi has been unequivocal in 
pronouncing that review of the Commission's administrative actions and conclusions must be 
premised upon the "totality of the foregoing evidence" and/or the employment of "a totality of 
the circumstances approach." Evans v. Hara's Inc., 123 Idaho 473,479, 898 P.2d 934 (1993); 
Chavez v. Stokes, Idaho_, 335 P.3d 414, 418 (2015). It would seem that Employer's 
request for the Court to effectively don blinders and arbitrarily choose the incomplete, 
uninfonned and derivative opinions of a non-specialist physiatrist does not comport with the 
controlling "totality of the evidence/circumstances" deliberative strictures. 
Additionally, in relation to evidence actually in record, Employer does not, and as a 
matter of practicality cannot, dispute: 
• That Dr. Friedman is not a cervical spme specialist and 1s otherwise not Board 
Certified in orthopedic surgery; 
• That Dr. Friedman actually refers patients with Jordan's cervical conditions to 
orthopedic surgeons such as Dr. Doen; 
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• That unlike Dr. Verska, Dr. Friedman's practice 1s not dedicated solely to spme 
treatment; 
" That unlike Dr. Verska, Dr. Friedman has not treated thousands of patients with 
cervical conditions like Jordan, nor perfonned hundreds of C4-7 surgeries; 
• That Dr. Doerr was the only doctor in this case presented with the opp01iunity to 
personally visualize and assess Jordan's affected cervical spine through actually 
perfonning the subject June 6, 2012, C4-7 anterior cervical decompression and 
fusion; 
o That Dr. Friedman was not provided with, nor did he personally review any of 
Jordan's 2010 treatment records when he generated his December 22, 2011, IME 
report; 
• That Dr. Friedman did not have all of the medical records and diagnostic imaging 
available to, and reviewed by, Ors. Doerr and Verska; 
• That Dr. Friedman did not perfonn a comprehensive review of Dr. Doerr's surgical 
report; 
• That unlike Ors. Doerr and Verska, Dr. Friedman was not provided with, nor did he 
ever personally review the actual MRI diagnostic imaging films, but rather relied 
upon the second-hand interpretations thereof; 
• That unlike Ors. Doerr and Verska, Dr. Friedman was not provided with, nor did he 
ever personally review the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI imaging or 
resultant radiological report; and 
• That Dr. Friedman completely failed to explain exactly how and when Jordan's 
indistinguishable cervical symptoms as caused by the "Exacerbation of cervical spine 
in 201 O," were supposedly subsumed by a previously asymptomatic degenerative 
condition. 
Furthennorc, given that the evidence in record establishes the occurrence of at least three (3) 
MRI's, including the one perfonned on May 25, 2012, not only is Employer's insistence of 
"significant fact emerging from comparison of the two MRI results" redundant, it demonstrates 
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the incomplete nature of Dr. Friedman's resultant opinions. Respondents' I 0/10/15 Response 
Brief, pg. 22. 
Moreover, in proffering this tenuous "degenerative vs. acute" depiction in ad finitum, 
Employer conveniently ignores a fundamental, controlling precept of Idaho law. Specifically, 
eighty (80) years of legal precedent, dictates that a "traumatic aggravation" of a pre-existing 
condition constitutes an injury for purposes of the Act. Nistad v. Winton Lumber Co., 59 Idaho 
533, 536, 85 P.2d 236 (1938) (Aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting disease or weakened 
condition is compensable if caused by the industrial accident), see also, Bowman v. Twin Falls 
Const. Co., 99 Idaho 312, 581 P.2d 770 (1978). Employer concedes that Jordan experienced a 
work-related traumatic event on January 12, 2010 while manually manipulating a one (1) ton 
trailer dolly. Further, Dr. Doerr rendered an unambi!:,JUous causation opinion, in his capacity as 
Jordan's treating surgeon, providing in pertinent part, "His 1 /12/10 injury resulted in a 
traumatic event with permanent aggravation of his initial preexisting injury." Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 
77 ( emphasis added). Similarly, Dr. V erska opined: 
[O]n a more probable-than-not basis that the 2010 injury caused him to have disc 
herniations at C5-C6 and C6-C7 and aggravated the preexisting degenerative 
changes at C4-C5 requiring him to have surgery at C4-C5, C5-C6, and C6-C7 
by Timothy Doerr. 
Hr'g Ex. F, pg. 107 (emphasis added); (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 18, LI. 12-25). Notably, even 
Dr. Friedman conceded a diagnosis of "Exacerbation of cervical spine pain in 201 O," but then, 
despite prior Commission admonitions, completely failed to reconcile how exactly Jordan 
presented for the December 22, 2011, IME, with cervical symptoms, including right scapular 
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"burning" pain, that were virtually identical to those he was exhibiting at the time Dr. Heiner 
discharged him in February of 2010. Davis v. US Silver-Idaho, Inc., 2013 IIC 0048.1, 0048.3 
(2013) ( on reconsideration); Hr' g Ex. 1, pg. 765 ( emphasis added). 
Significantly, with respect to the interpretation of "degenerative v. acute," besides the 
undisputed fact that Dr. Friedman never personally reviewed that actual diagnostic imaging, 
Employer fails to account for Dr. Friedman's own concession that "It's hard to tell the 
difference between an ongoing chronic problem ... and an acute injury superimposed." 
(Dr. Friedman Depo, p. 17, Ll. 22 24) (emphasis added). Simply stated Employer's attempted 
"degenerative vs. acute" differentiations constitute a "distinction without a difference" that do 
not account for controlling law and which are not even supported by Dr. Friedman. As Dr. 
Verska so aptly explained "[ A ]gain, we treat patients, not MR Is. 8" (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 29, 
LI. 20 - 21). 
Contrary to the actual facts in evidence, Employer goes on to declare that Dr. Friedman 
"had an opportunity to review Claimant's medical records ... " Respondents' 10/10/15 
Response Briet: pg. 20. As set fo1ih infra, this is simply not accurate, in that Dr. Friedman 
neither received nor reviewed all of the pertinent medical information in arriving at his 
respective opinions. In fact, Dr. Friedman's own records betray the fact that he did not 
personally review Claimant's 2010 treatment records when he generated his December 22, 2011, 
IME report. Hr' g Ex. 1, pgs. 759-60; (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 9, LI. 2-7; p. 29, LL 4 7). 
Similarly, in generating the December 22, 2011, IME report, Dr. Friedman merely recited 
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infonnation he extrapolated second-hand from Dr. Doe1T's treatment records. (Dr. Friedman 
Depo Tr., p. 26, LI. 6 19; p. 30, LL 1-30). In addressing the fact that he actually ascribed the 
wrong date to Claimant's 2010 industrial accident, Dr. Friedman testified: 
A. Well, it's in Dr. Doe1T's report. He reported it to me. It's not in the records 
I was sent. 
******************* 
A. . . . "Well it must have happened because Dr. Doerr put it in his report with a 
date," so he had something I didn't have. 
(Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 30, LI. 1 8) (emphasis added). Further, Dr. Friedman admitted that 
he did not even perfom1 a comprehensive review of Dr. DoeIT's surgical report and could not 
recall why he actually used the tenn "aggravation" in his IME report. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., 
p. 24, Ll. 16 20; p. 30, LL 15-22). Notably, Dr. Friedman also generated his opinions premised 
upon inaccurate information, including "In July of 2007, he was having constant pain in his neck 
and burning in his shoulders." Hr'g Ex. l, pg. 755. During cross-examination, Dr. Friedman 
acknowledged that this entry in his IME rep01i was eIToneous. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 28, LL 
7 p. 29, LI. 3). As before, unlike Dr. Verska, and Dr. DoeIT, Dr. Friedman never personally 
reviewed the actual MRI diagnostic imaging films, relying instead upon second-hand renditions, 
as well as Dr. DoeJT's interpretation thereof. Again, Employer never provided Dr. Friedman 
with, nor did he ever review, the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI. Thus, the indisputable 
facts establish that Dr. Friedman did not review Jordan's medical records and that he was the 
least infonned participant, as compared to Ors. Verska and DoeIT. 
8 Even Dr. Friedman conceded "I don't send people to have surgeries because I see something on an X-ray study." 
(Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 33, LI. 13 - 14 ). 
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Other than making the forgoing wholly unsubstantiated proclamations, at their premise, 
Employer's remaining assertions appear to be little more than a laudatory na1Tation of the 
Commission's April 13, 2015 Findings, Conclusions and Order, interspersed with an 
aggrandized recitation of Dr. Friedman's reports and testimony. It seems axiomatic that merely 
reiterating a clearly erroneous administrative decision and uninfonned, non-specialist medical 
opinions do not somehow cure such insunnountable defects. Likewise, summarily ignoring 
oveffiding legal/judicial mandates, does not somehow vitiate the controlling nature of such. 
ln summary, Employer failed to rebut the overwhelming factual, testimonial and medical 
evidence, or the controlling legal authority in this case. Obviously, the instant appeal raises 
numerous legal issues. Moreover, it is a matter of indisputable record that the Industrial 
Commission failed to identify, consider and incorporate all of Jordan's Exhibits. Further, it is 
indisputable that Dr. Friedman neither received nor reviewed all of the pertinent medical 
infom1ation in affiving at his respective opinions and, in some instances, proceeded under the 
premise of incorrect infom1ation. Additionally, Employer did not postulate any objective facts 
or legal authority that would "cure" the inherent defects of the Commission's administrative 
decision or Dr. Friedman's opinions. As such, the Commission's findings and conclusions are 
not premised upon substantial and competent evidence, nor do they comport with controlling 
legal authority, thereby rendering them clearly erroneous. Thus, the Commission's Order "must 
be set aside." Therefore, the Commission's Order should be remanded for proceedings 
accordingly. 
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B. The Industrial Commission Seemingly Applied the Incorrect Burden of 
Proof. 
The "Foust" presumption presumably applies to the uncontested January 12, 2010, work-
related accident and injuries. The Collli has been unequivocal in ruling that "when reviewing the 
decision of the Commission, this Corni is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments' that 
were presented to the Commission below ... Consequently, we 'will not consider arguments 
raised for the first time on appeal."' Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 Idaho 309, 315, 
336 P.3d 242 (2014) (quotations original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As in this case, 
the Court has had occasion to reaffirm that when a surety fails to raise an argument before the 
Commission, "It is well established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
heard." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 (1989) ( citations omitted) 
( emphasis added). "When reviewing questions of law, this Court exercises free review and may 
substitute its view for the Commission's view." Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859, 
934 P.2d 28 (1997). Employer failed to present any viable "burden of proof' or resolution of 
"doubt" asse1iions in accord with controlling law, and is otherwise precluded from making such 
argument as part of this appeal. 
In what can only be described as an invitation for the Comi to "engage in a semantic 
distinction analysis 9" as a means to ignore controlling legal precepts, Employer initially 
acknowledges the indisputable fact that Jordan raised the issue of the applicable burden of proof 
and cited commensurate legal authority in suppo1i thereof in his Opening Brief to the Court. 
9 Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho at 336. 
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Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 26-27. For appellate purposes, Jordan also raised the 
same issues supp01ied by legal authority in the underlying administrative proceedings, which 
Referee Marsters and the Commission summarily ignored. Clmt's 12/19/15 Post-Hr' g Opening 
Brief, pgs. 12-13. Incontrovertibly, throughout the Commission's administrative proceedings, 
Employer completely failed to present any arguments or controlling authority addressing the 
"Foust" presumption. As such, in accord with controlling law, any protestations that Employer 
purports to offer on the issue of the "Foust" presumption in its appellate Response Brief are 
seemingly academic and otherwise barred from consideration. Thus, as a matter of waiver, 
Employer ostensibly concedes that the Commission applied the incorrect burden of proof in this 
case as it relates to the January 12, 2010, industrial accident and injuries. 
Even assuming, argucndo, that waiver does not apply, Employer's assertions arc 
seemingly unsupported by any controlling legal authority specifically addressing the "Foust" 
presumption, but rather, as in other instances, are apparently premised upon Employer's 
continuous effort to ignore controlling legal edicts applicable to workers' compensation cases. 
Initially, Employer attempts, without any supporting legal authority, to artificially limit the 
"Foust" presumption by asserting that it only applies as to whether "an accident and injury 
occmTing on the employer's premises is compensable under the Worker's Compensation law." 
Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 26-27 (underline original). In attempting to derive 
some semblance of distinction, Employer declares "However, the compensability issues were 
never in doubt here." Id. at pg 27 ( emphasis added). It appears that Employer is equating 
and/or confusing the "Foust" presumption, with "the two-pronged test for detennining 
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compensability." Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho at 859. Regardless, this asse1iion defies 
the reality that this entire cause of action both before the Commission and this Comi is centered 
around the compensability of Jordan's neck conditions necessitating the June 6, 2012, C4-7 
cervical decompression and fusion as specifically related to the January 12, 2010, accident that 
occmTed on the Employer's premises. Despite this reality, Employer asserts, again without legal 
citation, "This Court has never held that Defendants have the burden of proving the negative on 
the issue of medical causation that an accident did not cause the need for the requested 
treatment." Id. This rationalization directly contradicts the fundamental legal premises of the 
"Foust" presumption and parallel controlling legal authority. 
Specifically, the Comi recently reaffinned: 
When an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a presumption arises that the 
injury arose out of the claimant's employment. Foust v. Birds },'ye Div. of Gen. 
Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418,419,422 P.2d 616,617 (1967). Once a claimant 
establishes that he suffered an injury on his employer's premises, the employer 
then bears "the burden of producing evidence" to show that the claimant's "injury 
did not arise out of or in the course of employment." Kessler v. Payette County, 
129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P .2d 28, 32 ( 1997). If the employer meets its burden, the 
employee, "without the benefit of the statutory presumption ... , has the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the facts essential to recovery." 
Evans v. Hara's Inc., 123 Idaho 473,479, 849 P.2d 934, 940 (1993). 
Vawter v. UPS, 155 Idaho 903,318 P.3d 893,898 (2014) (quotations original). Notably, the 
Court's unequivocal command that "the employer then bears 'the burden of producing 
evidence' to show that the claimant's "injury did not arise out of or in the course of 
employment" clearly routs Employer's nebulous "proving the negative" protestations. In fact, in 
addressing another statutory presumption, the Comi detennined "It was not sufficient that the 
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employer merely presented negative evidence tending to rule out other causes ... negative 
evidence alone will not defeat the statutory presumption ... " Evans v. Hara's Inc., 123 Idaho 
473, 478-79, 849 P.2d 934 (1993). 
In accord with Vawter, given that it is "undisputed 10" Jordan's January 12, 2010, activity 
of manually moving a one ( 1) ton dolly on the Employer's premises constituted an accident 
causing injury, the Commission was seemingly compelled to require Employer "to come forward 
with proof sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the [injury] is not one arising 
out of and in the course of employment." If applicable, the Commission's failure to impose the 
requisite reversed burden of proof further implicates Jordan's due process rights. At best, it 
could be argued that Employer's presentation of Dr. Friedman's incomplete, uninformed 
opinions overcame the "Foust" presumption, wherein Claimant then subsequently rebutted with 
the medical evidence and opinions of Drs. Foutz, Verska and Doen-, which currently stand 
uncontested, thereby establishing compensability to a reasonable degree of medical probability. 
Employer references "Gomez, supra and Walters, supra" in support of the general 
premise that an injured worker seeking additional medical benefits still bears the burden of 
proving the medical nexus. Respondents' I 0/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 27. From the onset, this 
proposition once again ignores the legal reality that the "Foust" presumption constitutes a 
distinct exception to the standard burden of proof. Moreover, Gomez and Waters are inapposite, 
as the "Foust" presumption was neither raised nor argued in either case. Gomez primarily 
addressed the premise that a claim for fmiher medical benefits invokes the issue of causation, 
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"because causation is at the root of all workers' compensation cases." Gomez v. Dura Mark, 
Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 603, 272 P.3d 569 (2012). Significantly, the Corni's detennination in 
Gomez that an Employer's partial payment for some medical benefits docs not statutorily, or 
otherwise "presume" causation, directly contravenes Employer's assertions that 
"compcnsability" in Jordan's case is not disputed because Employer payed for some of the 
medical care. Moreover, Waters is disparate given that the need for surgery was undisputed and 
the sole contested issue was pemrnnent partial disability in the context of a refusal to provide 
records documenting subsequent intervening events. See generally, Waters v. All Phase Const., 
156 Idaho 259, 322 P.3d 992 (2014). However, one interesting aspect of Waters was the 
Commission's rejection of an expert witness's opinions because he was not provided with all of 
the relevant medical records. As previously addressed, this same circumstance is present in the 
instant action, given that it is indisputable Employer failed to provide Dr. Friedman with all of 
the relevant medical records in this case, including, but not limited to, Jordan's 2010 treatment 
records as well as the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI. Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 78. 
Finally, in perpetuating its pervasive position that controlling law should be arbitrarily 
ignored in this case, Employer nebulously takes umbrage with Jordan's direct cite to the Corni's 
decision in Page, therein setting fo1ih "Case law holds that doubts about an injury arising out of 
and in the course of employment are resolved in favor of the claimant." Page v. McCain Foods, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 348, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005) (citation omitted). The Court's judicial 
precedent is replete with this long-standing mandate reflecting the "humane," "remedial" and 
10 "Undisputed. It is undisputed that Claimant suffered workplace accidents on May 16, 2006 and January 12, 2010, 







"liberal constrnction" premises of the Act. Vawter v. UPS, 155 Idaho 903,318 P.3d 893,898 
(2014) ("If there is doubt surrounding whether the accident in question arose out of and in the 
course of employment, the matter will be resolved in favor of the worker."); Spivey v. Novartis 
Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788 (2002) ("If there is doubt surrounding whether the 
accident in question arose out of and in the course of employment, the matter will be resolved in 
favor of the worker."); Dinius v. Loving Care & More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 900 P.2d 738 
(1999) ("Where there is some doubt whether the accident in question arose out of and in the 
course of employment, the matter will be resolved in favor of the worker."); Haldiman v. 
American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 957, 793 P.2d 187 (1990) ('doubtful cases should be 
resolved in favor of compensation'); Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 
(1989) ("Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured."); 
Kiger v. Idaho C0171., 85 Idaho 424, 432, 380 P.2d 208 (1963) ('doubtful cases should be 
resolved in favor of compensation'); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 26, 170 P.2d 
404 (1946) ('doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation'); Hansen v. Superior 
Prod. Co., 65 Idaho 457, 458, 146 P.2d 335 (1944) ("Doubts whether accident arose out of and 
in course of employment will be resolved in favor of workman."). As such, Employer's apparent 
subjective distain for over seventy (70) years of controlling judicial precedent11 does not 
somehow render such inapplicable. Thus, as with all injured workers under the Act, Jordan is 
while working for Meadow Gold, that resulted in injuries to his neck." R., pg. 2 (italics original). 
11 "For almost seventy years this Court has adhered to the principle that the worker's compensation law should be 
liberally construed in favor of the claimant in order to effect the object of the law and promote justice. Haldiman v. 
American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho at 956 (citations omitted). 
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entitled to the benefit of any doubt in relation to the injuries arising from the January 12, 2010, 
uncontested work-related accident. 
The "Foust" presumption ostensibly applies to the subject January I 0, 2012, industrial 
accident and injuries. Moreover, Employer is precluded from addressing the "Foust" 
presumption and effectively concedes that the Commission applied the incorrect burden of proof 
in this case. Fmiher, in accord with over seventy (70) years of controlling authority, Jordan is 
entitled to the benefit of doubt in relation to the injuries arising from the January 12, 2010, 
uncontested work-related accident. Therefore, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the 
opinions and records of Dr. Foutz, Verska and Doerr, stand unrebutted, thereby establishing 
compensability of Jordan's January 12, 2010, neck injuries necessitating the June 6, 2012, C4-7 
cervical decompression and fusion. 
C. Referee Marsters' Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
arc of "Consequence." 
Referee Marsters' March 18, 2015, Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are "consequential" to the Court and Jordan. It is "incumbent upon the Commission to 
include the recommended decision in the record and to at least briefly explain why it was 
discarded." Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supp{v Inc., 2015 Opinion No. 102, *9 (2015) (J. 
Jones, J., specially concurring). "This is paiiicularly critical where there may be some difference 
between the facts found by the referee and those made by the Commission." Id. at *9 (J. Jones, 
J., specially concurring). Employer's assertions disregard not only controlling judicial authority, 
but also the necessity of disclosing the underlying administrative practices at issue in this case. 
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As 1s endemic throughout, Employer's declaration that Referee Marsters' 
Recommendations and Conclusions "is really of no consequence" because the administrative 
decision would come out against Jordan regardless, directly contravenes the Court's unequivocal 
directives. Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pgs. 27 and 28. Significantly, the Court 
recently instructed that for purposes of assessing the Commission's "administrative practice," it 
must now "ensure that a referee's recommended decision is always included as paii of the record 
on appeal ... Otherwise, this Comi does not have a complete picture of the case upon which 
to base an infonned decision on appeal." Kelly, 2015 Opinion No. 102, *9 (J. Jones, J., specially 
concurring) ( emphasis added). Employer's asse1iions would also serve also circumvent 
disclosure of the "administrative practices" at issue in this case. 
Specifically, despite the Court's explicit admonition that "simply rnbberstamping . 
obvious e1Tors or inappropriate conclusions does not fulfill" the Commission's responsibilities, 
in this instance, the Commission indiscriminately adopted and incorporated Referee Marsters' 
e1Toneous and unsubstantiated "Findings of Fact" and inexplicable exclusion of Jordan's 
Exhibits, through its April 13, 2015, Decision and Order. Clark v. Shari's Management C01p., 
314 P.3d at 639 (J. Jones, J., specially concurring). Such "rubberstamping" is revealed by the 
fact that the Commission, verbatim, adopted Paragraph 36 of Referee Marsters' "Findings of 
Fact," which, as addressed in Jordan's Opening Brief, referenced testimony attributed to Jordan 
that does not exist. R., pg. 16; Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pg. 16. 
Similarly, the Commission also adopted Paragraph 37 of Referee Marsters' "Findings of Fact" 
which, as covered in Jordan's Opening Brief, relies upon a "telephone message from July 26, 
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2011" that is not contained in evidence. Id. Further, in arbitrarily incorporating Referee 
Marsters' capricious dismissal of Dr. Foutz's testimonial clarification/explanation as contained 
in Paragraph 37, the Commission also adopted the Referee's implicit bias in disregarding the 
Court's "substantial evidence" strictures as set forth in Stevens-McAtee. Stevens-McAtee v. 
Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325,336, 179 P.3d 288 (2008) 12 • 
As addressed infra, the pervasive extent of the "rubberstamping" is revealed by the fact 
that the Commission even copied the Referee's incomplete designation of Jordan's hearing 
Exhibits as actually entered into evidence. R., pg. 4; Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & 
Recommendations, pg. 4. As before, in failing to independently identify, consider and 
incorporate all of Jordan's hearing Exhibits, the Commission also fostered the Referee's 
demonstrable bias against Jordan. It seems fundamental and manifest that such "administrative 
practices" defeat the "humane" purposes of the Act. 
Referee Marsters' and the Commission's "administrative practices" are at issue in this 
case. The Commission verbatim "rubberstamped" Referee Marsters' reference and reliance upon 
non-existent testimony and an exhibit that does not exist in evidence. Further, the Commission 
sanctioned Referee Marsters' unmitigated disregard for "substantial evidence" strictures imposed 
by the Court. Moreover, the Commission "rubberstamped" Referee Marsters' improper and 
incomplete identification of Jordan's hearing Exhibits. As such, without Referee Marsters' 
March 18, 2015, Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court will "not 
12 "In light of[the treating doctor's] statements at deposition qualifying the medical forms which originated from his 
office, the evidence contained in those forms cannot be considered to be substantial evidence contradicting [the 
injured worker's] presentation of medical evidence." 
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have a complete picture of the case upon which to base an infonned decision on appeal." Thus, 
Employer's contention that Referee Marsters' Recommendations and Conclusions "is really of 
no consequence" derogates controlling law. Therefore, Referee Marsters' March 18, 2015, 
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are "consequential" as a matter of law, 
as well as for purposes of disclosing the administrative practices at play in this case. 
D. The Industrial Commission Erred in Determining that All Remaining Issues 
Were Moot. 
Employer concedes that in the event of reversal, the remaining issues must be addressed. 
Therefore, the Comi should order remand of all remaining issues for impmiial deliberation upon 
the recorded facts in accord with controlling law. 
E. Jordan Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Jordan is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Attorney fees may be recovered for 
unreasonable denial of benefits. Specifically, the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act provides in 
relevant part: 
Attorney's fees - Punitive costs in certain cases. - If the commission or any court 
before whom any proceedings are brought under this law dctennines that the 
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured 
employee ... without reasonable ground, or his surety neglected or refused within 
a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the 
injured employee ... the compensation provided by law ... In all such cases, the 
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees . . . shall be fixed by the 
comm1ss1on. 
See, I,C. § 72-804 ( emphasis original) ( emphasis added). Given the unrebutted facts in evidence 
and controlling legal authority in this instant action, Employer's "denial" of Jordan's claim was 
entirely unreasonable. 
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From a fundamental perspective, Jordan's worker's compensation claim is relatively 
straight-forward. Specifically, Jordan experienced industrial accidents in 2006 and 2010 while 
working for the same Employer, which resulted in injuries that were accepted and partially 
covered by two (2) distinct Sureties. Upon release from the 2006 work-related accident, Jordan 
only experienced negligible symptoms that always resolved. In January of 2007, Jordan received 
treatment for a work-related ankle injury, without any corresponding neck, cervical, or am1 
symptoms. However, following the January 12, 2010, accepted injury(ies), involving manually 
pushing a one-ton trailer dolly by himself, Jordan was released from medical care premised upon 
an en-oneous assessment that his symptoms "did not indicate any significant pathology and 
should resolve gradually over time." During the interim, this prognosis proved to be wholly 
inaccurate as Jordan continued to experience cervical related symptoms. Jordan's interim 
struggle with unrelenting cervical symptoms was con-oborated by his Board Certified family 
physician, Dr. Foutz. Subsequently, upon receiving all of the relevant medical records, Jordan's 
treating, Board Certified orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Doen, authored an opinion to the Surety 
covering the 2006 injury, setting forth in pertinent part, "His O 1 /12/10 injury resulted in a 
traumatic event with pennanent aggravation of his initial preexisting injury" and recommended 
cervical surgical intervention. 
Unfortunately, the record demonstrates that rather than lend credence to Dr. Doen's well-
founded, expert opinions, the two (2) Sureties, with arguably conflicting interests, pooled 
resources and implemented a fonnulaic "preexisting degenerative disease" strategy as a means to 
devise a "medical" basis to absolve them both of liability, while simultaneously serving to 
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completely deny Jordan the medical treatment he needed to address the cervical injuries arising 
from the January 12, 2010, accepted accident. To that end, the Sureties hired a physiatrist, with 
no orthopedic cervical surgical expe1iise whatsoever, to address the need for specialized cervical 
surgical intervention, and to critique the opinions as well as recommendations of Jordan's Board 
Cc1iified treating orthopedic surgeon. 
Specifically, the record is indisputable in establishing that in portending to obtain an 
"independent medical opinion" from Dr. Friedman through his December 22, 2011, IME repo1i, 
Employer completely failed to provide or otherwise withheld Claimant's 2010 treatment records, 
thereby guaranteeing a predctennincd outcome. Furthennore, despite full knowledge of its 
existence, Employer also withheld the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI from Dr. 
Friedman's consideration, as apparent means to perpetuate his initial unsubstantiated causation 
op11110ns. 
In awarding attorney fees under analogous circumstances, the Commission held: 
Additionally, by refusing to give medical experts all the facts ... in fom1ing his 
opinion, Defendant acted unreasonably ... To taint those experts' opinions in 
such a manner seriously undercuts credence which the Commission might 
otherwise afford those opinions. Moreover, such tactics inevitably result in a 
continuing unreasonable denial of acclaim. 
Ida2003 v. Se(f-lnsured Employer, 2003 IIC 0188.1, 0188.8 (2003) ( emphasis added). 
Remarkably, the Commission reproved this exact "preexisting degenerative disease" strategy of 
deriving an opinion premised upon omission of pertinent medical infonnation, wherein Dr. 
Friedman utilized the same approach for the same Defense finn. See, Bogar v. Sodexo Inc., 
2012 IIC 0100.l, 0100.6 ("In arriving at these conclusions, Dr. Friedman apparently neither took 
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nor reviewed any x-rays of Claimant's back"), see also, Davis v. US Silver, 2012 IIC 0103.1, 
0103.12 (2012) ("Even so, [Dr. Friedman] did not have access to the actual films for the 2002, 
2005 and 2008 MRis"). It is incontrovertible that Jordan has a right to rely upon the 
Commission's consistent application of the law. Medrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 769-70, 
40 P.3d 125 (2002). 
The overarching irony in this scenario is that the even absent cervical surgical expertise, 
Dr. Friedman opined that the fusion surgery perfonned by Dr. DoeIT was "medically 
appropriate" and "reasonable" with a good outcome, but, in his assessment, was perfonned 
premised upon the wrong diagnosis. (Dr. Friedman Dcpo Tr., p. 35, LI. 4 10). The 
incongruous and result oriented nature of such a proposition is self-evident and presents as 
"armchair doctoring," serving only to "second guess" the treatment requirements of a Surgeon 
who had the incomparable opportunity to actually visualize and treated the affected area through 
the invasive June 6, 2012, procedure. 
In summary, given Employer's formulaic and fabricated basis for denying Jordan 
necessary medical treatment, including cervical surgery, attorney fees should be awarded to the 
full extent allowed by Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. Therefore, the Court should award 
attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all stages of Jordan's claim, including those below, on 
appeal and any on remand. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In consideration of the foregoing argument and authority, Jordan respectfully requests 
that the Court: reverse the Commission's findings that "Claimant's testimony concerning the 
history and cause of his symptoms following the 2006 and 2010 accidents lacks substantive 
credibility;" reverse the Commission's conclusion that Jordan "failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that his 2012 cervical spine surgery was necessitated, in whole or in 
part, by either the 2006 or 2010 industrial accidents;" reverse the Commission's conclusion that 
"All other issues are moot;" and award attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all stages of 
Jordan's claim, including those below, on appeal and any on remand; and remand for 
proceedings consistent therewith. 
~ DA TED this _/ __ day of December, 2015. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
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